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ABSTRACT
Can financial integration, particularly the cross-border investments of multinational firms, help
explain the synchronization of business cycles? This paper presents evidence on the comovement
of returns and investment within U.S. multinational firms to address this question. These firms
constitute  significant  fractions  of  economic  output  and  investment  in  most  large  economies,
suggesting that they could create significant economic linkages. Aggregate measures of rates of
return and investment rates of U.S. multinational firms located in different countries are highly
correlated across countries. Firm-level regressions demonstrate that rates of return and investment
rates of affiliates are highly correlated with the rates of return and investment of the affiliate's parent
and other affiliates within the same parent system, controlling for country and industry factors. The
evidence on these interrelationships and the importance of multinationals to local economies
suggests that global firms may be an important channel for transmitting economic shocks. This
evidence also sheds light on asset pricing puzzles related to the diversification benefits provided by
multinational firms.
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To what degree do increasing levels of financial integration amongst the world’s 
major economies lead to changes in the synchronization of business cycles?  In particular, 
what role could the dramatic increases in foreign direct investment play in explaining the 
comovement of aggregate measures of economic activity?  This paper sheds light on 
these questions by providing facts about the scope of foreign direct investment in 
different countries and the correlations in investment and returns of distinct U.S. 
multinational operations around the world.   
The relevance of a world factor in explaining movements in economic aggregates 
appears to be uncontroversial.  What is less well understood is what factors might 
account for the high degrees of correlation in macroeconomic variables.  High levels of 
financial and trade integration, as pointed out by Frankel and Rose (1998) and Heathcote 
and Perri (2002), can theoretically lead to either increasingly idiosyncratic or correlated 
movements in economic aggregates.  The link between financial and trade integration and 
the synchronization of business cycles remains an open question, with somewhat 
contradictory evidence emerging from econometric analysis of aggregate data.   
Rather than filter the economy-wide data in a distinctive way, we approach this 
question with micro data on the behavior of U.S. multinational companies (MNCs) and 
emphasize the role that linkages within these firms may play in creating global linkages.  
In order to explore this channel, we pose a series of questions about the patterns of U.S. 
multinational activity around the world.  First, are the activities of multinational firms 
sufficiently important to local economies to create these linkages?  Second, is there any 
evidence that aggregate measures of multinational activity comove in a manner that is 
distinctive from the behavior of local firms around the world?  Finally, is there evidence 
that activities of U.S. multinationals in the U.S. or in other host countries help explain 
affiliate investment plans and rates of returns after controlling for conditions in the 
affiliate host country and industry?  Put differently, is multinational affiliate performance 
around the world a function of parent shocks or shocks affecting other affiliates within 
the same firm after controlling for national, industry and world factors?           2
The analysis makes use of measures of the gross product, or value added, of 
multinational activity and micro data that capture the inner workings of multinational 
firms.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides national income accounting 
analogs for the activities of U.S. multinationals around the world. These allow for the 
comparison of economic output by multinational firms and the size of the local economy.  
Additionally, these data allow for the calculation of rates of return that are a staple of 
macroeconomic analysis, as in Poterba (1998).  Affiliate-level data on investment and 
returns are employed to determine the degree to which returns and investments by 
multinational affiliates around the world comove with returns and investments of the 
same firm outside of the host country controlling for local returns and investment rates. 
The results indicate that U.S. multinationals constitute a significant fraction of 
output and investment for many major economies and their significance has grown over 
the last two decades.  Averaged across the G-6 countries, U.S. multinational affiliates 
alone comprised more than four percent of output and capital expenditures in their host 
countries in 1999 with levels as high as ten percent in several countries.
1  These ratios 
indicate the potential for multinationals to act as a channel of economic shocks.  A 
descriptive look at the correlation coefficients of rates of return for multinational activity 
across countries indicates that such correlations are high and in most cases exceed 
correlations of returns based on economy wide measures.  Similar patterns exist for 
correlations of rates of investment of multinational firms relative to local economy 
aggregates. 
These high correlations of country-wide returns and investment within 
multinational firms suggest that shocks that occur in one part of the world may be 
transmitted across borders as a consequence of a multinational firm’s worldwide network 
of subsidiaries.  In order to test this more rigorously, affiliate-level regressions attempt to 
identify how affiliate returns comove with local firm returns, the returns of other foreign 
affiliates of the same parent, and the returns on U.S. operations of the affiliate’s parents.  
Both within-MNC measures of returns – the returns on U.S. operations and returns on 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we refer to the G-6 countries to indicate the G-7 (G-8) after excluding the United 
States (the United States and Russia).  G-6 countries include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
the United Kingdom.   3
other foreign operations of the parent – are significant in explaining the return of 
affiliates controlling for local returns.  In a similar vein, parent and other foreign affiliate 
investment rates retain explanatory power in explaining affiliate investment rates after 
controlling for local economy investment rates.  These results are robust to the inclusion 
of country/year and industry/year fixed effects that control for the country and industry 
shocks that have been emphasized in the macroeconomics literature, as in Stockman 
(1988) and Glick and Rogoff (1995).  These results hold for the overall sample of 
affiliates and the sample of affiliates in G6 countries.  These results suggest that the 
economic linkages created by intrafirm dynamics, emphasized by Peek and Rosengren 
(1997, 2000) for the case of Japanese bank lending and California real estate activity, 
may be considerably more widespread.    
While the various fixed effects employed in the analysis control for a variety of 
alternative explanations, it is possible that the results reflect an important industry with its 
own dynamics, the petroleum industry, or linkages created by intrafirm trade.  In order to 
consider these alternatives, further regression analysis tests if observed correlations differ 
for affiliates in manufacturing relative to non-manufacturing and for affiliates that serve 
the local market relative to exporting affiliates.  Robustness checks indicate that the 
dynamics of the petroleum industry are not driving the results, that the patterns hold for 
manufacturing affiliates, and that results are similar for affiliates that do and do not sell 
goods outside of their host country.       
Taken together, the evidence provided in the paper suggests that the scope and 
dynamics of multinational firm activity are consistent with these firms serving as a 
meaningful channel for the transmission of economic shocks.  Investment and returns are 
linked across parts of the same firm located in different countries, and these linkages 
cannot be explained by patterns in aggregate investment and returns at the country or 
industry level.  This analysis raises several questions for future research.  What aspects of 
firm internal markets – internal capital markets, transfers of technology – might create 
these linkages?  How much of these linkages can be explained by shocks to input costs 
faced by multinationals or by international rent sharing by workers across borders within 
multinationals?  To what degree are multinational firms contributing to the 
synchronization of business cycles relative to trade linkages and bank lending and other   4
factors?  Given the exploratory nature of the analysis in this paper, we believe the results 
suggest that further work on how multinational firms create global economic linkages is 
merited.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the 
related literature on international business cycles and the internal capital markets of firms 
and outlines the empirical methodology.  The third section provides an overview of the 
growth of U.S. multinational activity, the changing industrial composition of investment, 
the relative importance of U.S. multinational activity to local economies around the 
world, and the changing geographic concentration of U.S. multinational activity.  The 
fourth section provides evidence on the correlation of returns and investment rates to 
understand the economic linkages created by multinational firms. The fifth section 
discusses results from the firm-level regressions and the sixth section provides robustness 
checks for the basic results.  A concluding section suggests extensions of this work. 
2.  Related Literature and Empirical Methodology 
  This investigation of the correlation of returns and investment plans within 
multinational firms is related to the growing literature on the synchronization of business 
cycles and asset returns and some recent literature on multinational and multidivision 
firms that points out potential sources of synchronicity with firms.   
2.1.  International Business Cycles 
Studies of the synchronization of business cycles typically rely on econometric 
tests employing macroeconomic aggregates, as in Baxter and Stockman (1989), Backus, 
Kehoe and Kydland (1992, 1995), Doyle and Faust (2002), Kose, Otrock and Whiteman 
(2003), and Stock and Watson (2003).  These studies typically find evidence of a world 
factor in dictating output variability with somewhat contradictory results on the trend in 
degrees of comovement amongst major economies.  Heathcote and Perri (2002) find 
reduced correlations in output and tie these reduced correlations to increased financial 
integration.  Brodo and Helbling (2003) suggest that synchronization levels have 
increased over a longer historical period and across a variety of exchange rate regimes.  
These studies typically conclude, as in Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003) and Stock and 
Watson (2003), with calls for further investigation of the sources, rather than the degree,   5
of these global correlations.  One such investigation of the sources of these correlations is 
provided by Frankel and Rose (1998) who provide evidence of a correlation between 
trade linkages and output correlations.
2    
  Linkages between economic aggregates can be particularly trenchant in an 
emerging market setting where output fluctuations can be large and appear, to some 
observers, to be contagious.  Examinations of these linkages of output and stock market 
movements in emerging markets have emphasized trade linkages (as in Eichengreen and 
Rose (1999)), financial flows (as in Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2001)), or 
combinations of these factors.
3  Studies of the comovement of returns in emerging 
markets are part of the larger literature on the degree to which stock markets comove 
(pioneered in King and Wadhwani (1990) and surveyed recently in Goetzmann, Li and 
Rouwenhorst (2002)) and if assets are priced locally or globally, as reviewed in Karolyi 
and Stulz (2002). 
  As detailed below, the considerable scope of multinational activity around the 
world suggests that multinational firms may be a channel for the transmission of 
economic shocks around the world.  There is limited evidence on this channel with 
contradictory conclusions.  Forbes and Chinn (2003) indicate that bilateral FDI flows do 
not explain global linkages in financial markets while Jansen and Stokman (2004) 
indicated that international business cycle comovements are more pronounced for 
countries with large amounts of bilateral foreign direct investment flows.  An 
investigation of the degree to which returns and investment plans comove within firms 
using micro data affords the opportunity to isolate more precisely the scope of this 
transmission channel.  Such an examination also affords the opportunity to incorporate a 
rich set of industry and country controls given the interest in the literature, as in 
Stockman (1988) and Glick and Rogoff (1995), in the relative importance of industry and 
country specific shocks factors in explaining investment and current account behavior.   
2.2.  The Internal Linkages of Multinational and Multidivisional Firms 
                                                 
2 See Canova and Marrinan (1998), Canova and de Nicoló (2003) and Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003) for 
alternative econometric techniques for identifying common components to business cycles and their 
sources using aggregate data.    
3 See the papers collected in Claessens and Forbes (2001).   6
  The literature of the internal markets of firms indicates some potential reasons for 
why returns and investment comove within a firm.  Finance scholars have recently turned 
their attention to the efficiency of the allocation of capital within firms.
4  Both Rajan, 
Servaes and Zingales (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) propose rationales for how 
investment becomes “socialized” through a multi-divisional enterprise leading to 
inefficient allocation of capital within conglomerates.  Such a socialization of investment 
or cross-subsidization would appear as correlated investment and performance across 
countries in a multinational setting.  In the multinational setting, firms appear to use 
internal capital market opportunistically to overcome local rigidities – including costly 
external finance and capital controls – as in Desai, Foley and Hines (2003a, 2004).  Given 
that these internal capital markets appear to be so active, it is conceivable that shocks to 
geographically disparate operations could be transmitted around the world through 
multinationals. 
  Underlying trends in the patterns of real activity by multinationals might also give 
rise to global linkages.  As described by Feenstra (1995), production processes within 
these firms have increasingly become fragmented around the world.  As a consequence, 
multinational activity within these economies is more likely to be tied to non-local factors 
providing another channel for the transmission of shocks and the comovement of returns 
within firms.  Desai, Foley and Hines (2003b) demonstrate how these patterns of the 
internalization of activity have also changed the ownership preferences of multinational 
firms.    
It is also possible that changes in input costs for multinationals give rise to 
comovement of returns and investment within firms.  Budd, Konings, and Slaughter 
(2002) consider the process by which wages are set within multinationals and raise the 
possibility that this process affects the transmission of shocks across borders.  This work 
finds evidence that wages in one location depend on the performance of the firm in other 
locations.  Therefore, international rent sharing across workers of multinational firms 
might also induce the comovement of returns within firms. 
                                                 
4 See Stein (2003) for a survey of this literature.     7
  There has been limited empirical evidence on the interrelationship of investment 
plans within firms that span national boundaries.  Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) find 
that Japanese bank lending decisions in California reflect changes in the value of their 
Japanese loan portfolios and that these changed lending decisions had real consequences.  
More widespread evidence of linkages created by multinational firms has not been 
provided.  The one exception to this that we know of is the study by Stevens and Lipsey 
(1992) of seven multinational firms over twenty years.  This study, despite its limited 
sample, finds evidence of significant interdependence in investment plans between 
foreign and domestic operations.  If, indeed, investment plans and returns are highly 
correlated around the world within a multinational firm, this may help explain why 
investors place a limited value on mutlinationality, as examined in Errunza and Senbet 
(1984) and Morck and Yeung (1991), or even a discount on global diversification as in 
Denis, Denis and Yost (2002). 
2.3.  Data and Empirical Methodology 
In order to isolate the scope and dynamics of U.S. multinational activity, we 
employ detailed data collected by the U.S government.  We use the 1982 through 1999 
results of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) annual survey of U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad to create a panel of data on the gross product, returns, and investment 
of U.S. multinational affiliates and parents.  These surveys ask reporters to file detailed 
survey forms for each affiliate, as well as information on the domestic activities of U.S. 
parents. The International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act governs the 
collection of the data. The Act ensures that “use of an individual company’s data for tax, 
investigative, or regulatory purposes is prohibited.”  Willful noncompliance with the Act 
can result in penalties of up to $10,000 or a prison term of one year.  As a result of these 
assurances and penalties, BEA believes that coverage is close to complete and levels of 
accuracy are high. 
U.S. direct investment abroad is defined as the direct or indirect ownership or 
control by a single U.S. legal entity of at least ten percent of the voting securities of an 
incorporated foreign business enterprise, or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated   8
foreign business enterprise.
5  The survey forms that U.S. multinational firms are required 
to complete vary depending on the year and the size of the entity surveyed.  Although the 
most extensive data are available for 1982, 1989, 1994 and 1999, when BEA conducted 
Benchmark Surveys, we use data from the intervening years as well.
6  Since many of the 
variables of interest are not collected for minority owned affiliates, we restrict our sample 
to include affiliates in which the combined direct and indirect ownership claim by a U.S. 
parent exceeds 50 percent.  BEA collects identifiers linking affiliates through time, 
thereby permitting the creation of a panel.
7   
The BEA data include national income accounting analogs for the activities of 
multinational affiliates in countries around the world.  Affiliate gross product, a measure 
of value-added that is computed by BEA from data reported in the survey, was developed 
in order to measure the extent of multinational activities in a way that is free from double 
counting, unlike sales data that reflect value-added within an affiliate and the value of 
intermediate inputs purchased by an affiliate.  As in national income accounting, this 
measure is decomposed into employee compensation, profit-type return (a measure of 
profits from current production), net interest paid, indirect business taxes, and a capital 
consumption allowance.  
The analysis that follows begins by employing the BEA measure of gross product 
in order to characterize the distribution of U.S. multinational firms across countries and 
industries.  Values of aggregate affiliate data within a host country are compared to host 
country GDP, as measured by the World Bank (2003), to indicate the prevalence of 
multinational activity.  We also compute measures of the importance of affiliate 
investment in host countries by scaling aggregate affiliate investment by gross fixed 
capital formation, taken from the World Bank (2003).   
In order to consider the comovement of returns of the aggregate activities of U.S. 
multinationals in distinct host countries, we employ a variety of measures.  Using the 
                                                 
5 In order to be considered as a legitimate foreign affiliate, the foreign business enterprise should be paying 
foreign income taxes, have a substantial physical presence abroad, have separate financial records, and 
should take title to the goods it sells and receive revenue from the sale.  In order to determine ownership 
stakes in the presence of indirect ownership, BEA determines the percentage of parent ownership at each 
link and then multiplies these percentages to compute the parent’s total effective ownership. 
6 In non-benchmark years, reporting exemption levels were higher and less information is collected. 
7 For a detailed description of the BEA data, see Mataloni (1995).     9
gross product data, we define the rate of return as the ratio of the sum of the profit-type 
return, net interest paid, indirect business taxes and the capital consumption allowance to 
total assets.  We also employ two financial accounting based measures of returns; return 
on equity is the ratio of net income to owners’ equity and return on assets is the ratio of 
net income to assets.  In order to compute correlations in economy wide returns, we rely 
on data in Poterba (1998) and data from Ken French’s website for information on rates of 
return and return on equity.
8  The Ken French data cover a large sample of publicly 
traded firms and include information on the dollar stock return in local markets also.  In 
studying the comovement of investment, we analyze correlations of aggregate affiliate 
capital expenditures across countries as well as these expenditures scaled by aggregate 
affiliate gross product and affiliate assets.  Economy wide investment is measured as the 
value of gross fixed capital formation, and we analyze correlations of this measure and 
this measure scaled by GDP. 
In order to analyze the comovement of returns and investment within the firm 
more rigorously, we employ a specification where the dependent variable is a measure of 
returns or investment at the affiliate-year level.  In order to trace through effects of a 
multinational parent’s activity elsewhere in the world, we include independent variables 
that measure returns or investment for the affiliate’s parent in the U.S. (referred to as 
parent returns or parent investment) and the returns or investment of other affiliates of the 
parent operating abroad (referred to as other affiliate returns or other affiliate 
investment).  Finally, measures of local firm activity are also included as explanatory 
variables as are varying combinations of affiliate, year, and country/year and 
industry/year fixed effects in order to ensure that these within-firm measures are not 
reflecting omitted factors.  All standard errors are clustered at the firm level to correct for 
serial correlation.  
3.  The Distribution of Multinational Activity, 1982-1999 
In order to consider the scope and nature of U.S. multinational activity, Table 1 
provides some sense of where multinationals have historically been most active, by 
                                                 
8 The Ken French data can be found at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.   10
country, and how this compares with the share of non-U.S. economic output that these 
countries constitute.  These figures are presented for the four benchmark years and are 
limited to those countries where either the country’s share in worldwide output or the 
country’s share of U.S. multinational output was at least one percent in 1999.   
Several patterns emerge from this table.  First, U.S. multinational activity is more 
concentrated than global output.  By 1999, these twenty three countries constitute 83% of 
non-U.S. output and 88% of U.S. multinational activity.  This level of concentration has 
also increased quite markedly over the last two decades.  Second, it is useful to consider 
those countries for which the two measures of the distribution of activity differ by large 
margins.  Here, several large discrepancies are apparent.  The United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, and Ireland stand out as countries with disproportionately large shares of U.S. 
multinational activity.  In contrast, many countries in Asia – most notably Japan – feature 
uncharacteristically low levels of U.S. multinational activity.  Finally, several large 
emerging markets – particularly China and India – that have received large amounts of 
attention for their inward foreign direct investment still have relatively little U.S. 
multinational activity given their share of world output, despite recent sharp 
accelerations.  It is reassuring that these figure are relatively well-behaved over time and 
conform, largely, to the folklore on U.S. multinational activity as being concentrated in 
developed countries, as having a bias toward Anglo countries, and as being of limited 
scope in Japan.  It is also worth noting that if multinationals did play a significant role in 
driving international business cycles, the distribution of U.S. multinational activity would 
help explain the patterns presented in Stock and Watson (2003) of an Anglo block of 
correlated economies and the distinct dynamic of the Japan economy.  
In order to consider the possibility that multinational firms serve as channel of 
economic shocks, it is useful to isolate the relative contribution of U.S. multinationals to 
local output or investment.  Table 2 presents the ratio of U.S. MNC gross product and 
investment to economy wide measures, by country.  The first column presents the 
average ratio of affiliate gross product to host country GDP over the 1982 to 1999 period, 
and the second column presents this ratio for 1999.  The third and fourth column present 
ratios of affiliate capital expenditures to gross fixed capital formation averaged over the 
sample period and for 1999.  These ratios are crude measures of the relative importance   11
of multinational activity for local economies.  They are crude in several respects.  First, 
they only represent U.S. multinational activity and, as such, understate the scope of 
overall multinational activity.  Second, measures of economy-wide activity in the 
denominators include government activity, and, therefore, the ratios understate the 
relative importance of multinational firms to the private sector in these countries. 
Table 2 reveals several salient facts about the relative importance of U.S. 
multinational activity.  First, a comparison of the averages from 1982 to 1999 and in 
1999 indicates that the relative importance of U.S. multinational activity has increased in 
almost all of the countries in the table.  Second, the increases in the relative importance of 
multinationals are most pronounced in Asia, though multinationals maintain a more 
significant presence in Europe than in Asia.  Third, the U.S. multinational shares of total 
output and investment vary considerably but are seldom trivial and are often quite large.  
For Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Canada, these shares are close to or above ten 
percent.  Most multinational shares are in the single digits, which given the measurement 
issues mentioned above, seems a significant enough channel to create global linkages.       
Finally, it is useful to consider the industrial dispersion of U.S. multinational 
activity.  The share of multinational gross product, by industry is provided in Figure 1.  
Unsurprisingly, the share of petroleum, which is separated from manufacturing in the 
BEA data and includes extraction, refining, service, and wholesale trade activities related 
to oil and gas, has dropped precipitously over the period from 1982 to 1999 as shares of 
several sectors – notably, services and finance-related industries – have increased.  Given 
the distinct dynamics that are potentially associated with the petroleum industry, the 
correlations of returns and investment presented below are considered separately for 
manufacturing industries.  
4.  The Correlations of Returns and Investment Inside Multinational Firms 
We begin by presenting some raw correlations of returns and investment rates of 
affiliates across countries and compare these correlations to correlations of economy 
wide measures across countries.  These correlation tables are obviously only suggestive 
since the time series data on U.S. multinational activity only cover the 1982 to 1999 
period.  Descriptive statistics for the sample employed in the correlation tables and the   12
regression tables are presented in Table 3.  Tables 4 and 5 present the correlations across 
G-6 countries. 
The top panel of Table 4 provides correlations of our three measures of returns to 
affiliate activity; these measures are the rate of return (ROR), the return on equity (ROE), 
and the return on assets (ROA).  All of these correlations are positive, and all but five of 
them differ from zero by statistically significant margins.  Correlations of rates of return 
are the largest, ranging from 0.87 to 0.97.  There is more variation in the correlations of 
ROE and ROA than ROR.  Part of this variation may result from shortcomings of these 
measures in capturing returns to capital.  Net income and owners’ equity reflect only a 
component of returns and a component of capital.  They also reflect the capital structure 
choice of affiliates, a choice that is likely to vary through time within countries and one 
that may be guided by a variety of tax and managerial considerations. 
The bottom panel of Table 4 presents similar correlations using economy wide 
measures of returns.  The ROR correlations are all smaller than the ROR correlations 
observed for multinational firms.  The Ken French data do not cover Canada, but for the 
other countries, economy wide correlations of ROE are smaller than affiliate correlations 
for all but two country pairs.  It is not possible to directly compare correlations of stock 
returns to any measure of affiliate returns since most affiliates are not publicly traded, but 
these correlations also are smaller that the correlations of affiliate rates of return, and they 
are of a similar magnitude as the correlations of affiliate ROE.  If attention is restricted to 
multinational affiliates in manufacturing, in order to put aside concerns that common 
shocks to the petroleum industry are driving our results, the results are largely the same.  
Table 5 shows correlations of measures of investment across countries.  The top 
panel presents correlations computed from three measures of affiliate investment activity: 
the level of capital expenditures, capital expenditures scaled by gross product, and capital 
expenditures scaled by assets.  All but one of these correlations is positive and more than 
three-fourths of the presented correlations are positive and statistically significant.  The 
correlations of levels of capital expenditures appear to be the highest.  Since capital 
expenditures are measured in nominal terms, these correlations could reflect correlations 
in inflation rates.  The other two measures are not subject to this potential shortcoming.   13
The bottom panel of Table 5 displays correlations of two economy wide measures 
of investment.  Capital expenditures are measured using data on gross fixed capital 
formation, and the correlations cover levels of capital expenditures and capital 
expenditures scaled by GDP.  Although the correlations of country wide measures of 
investment exceed correlations of affiliate measures of investment in just over half of the 
comparable cases, both sets of correlations are of a similar magnitude for most country 
pairs.  As with the correlations of returns, restricting attention to manufacturing affiliates 
does not materially change these results.  Taken together, the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 
indicates that returns and investment are correlated within U.S. multinational firms.  In 
many cases, the correlations of these measures of activity within firms exceed 
correlations of these measures for the broader economy.  In order to study the correlates 
of affiliate returns more carefully, we now turn to regression analysis that permits for a 
richer set of controls for other confounding factors.  
5.  Firm Level Regressions 
The specification outlined in section 2.3 provides a method for further analyzing 
the degree to which the correlations of aggregate returns and investment represent within-
firm dynamics.  Table 6 presents firm-level evidence on the correlation of returns inside 
multinational firms.  In order to facilitate comparison of returns across the different parts 
of a multinational firm, we consider the accounting based measure of return on equity 
and employ the Ken French data to control for local firm returns on equity.  Observations 
are at the affiliate-year level, and the dependent variable is the return on equity, 
calculated as the ratio of net income to owner’s equity.  The specifications in columns 1-6 
employs affiliate fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across affiliates 
and year fixed effects to capture movements in a world factor that might explain the 
comovement of returns.  It is worth noting that these year fixed effects also control for a 
wide variety of global shocks like oil price changes that would potentially drive a world 
factor. 
In the simple specification in column 1, the coefficient on parent return on equity 
indicates that an affiliate’s parent domestic return helps explain movements in affiliate 
returns in a statistically significant manner.  Column 2 considers the role of the return on   14
the activities of the other foreign affiliates within a parent system by including this return 
as an additional explanatory variable.  In this specification the sample size is reduced as 
affiliates that are the only foreign affiliate in a parent system are dropped.  The 
coefficient on the parent’s domestic activity is slightly smaller but remains significant, 
and the 0.14 coefficient on the parent’s other foreign activity is positive and highly 
significant.  Of course, these coefficients might represent the underlying correlation of 
country level returns across countries in which a parent is active.  In order to address this 
concern, the specification in column 3 includes the affiliate’s host country return on 
equity.  Given the limited coverage of the French ROE data, the sample is reduced quite 
dramatically.  In this specification, the local return is not significant, and the coefficients 
on the parent’s domestic and foreign activities remain largely unchanged.   
Given the prevalence of affiliate activity in G-6 countries, the high level of 
interest in the transmissions of shocks among these countries, and the availability of data 
within these countries, it useful to run the specification presented in columns 1-3 in just 
this setting.  The results are largely similar with parent domestic and foreign returns 
explaining affiliate returns and local returns having a positive but insignificant sign.  
Coefficients on parent ROE and other affiliate ROE  are very similar to previous 
specifications reflecting the importance of G-6 activity to the overall sample and 
suggesting that these factors have a similar relationship to affiliate ROE both inside and 
outside the G-6. 
Within the context of the G-6, it is possible to impose even further controls to 
account for the dynamics of local economies and affiliate industries.  Specifically, the 
specification in column 7 employs country/year and industry/year fixed effects.
9  The 
country/year fixed effects control for a variety of shocks that have similar effects across 
firms within a country including changes in interest rates, supply or demand shocks, and 
policy changes.  These fixed effects also control for time varying factors that are specific 
to US/host country country pairs, and therefore they rule out interpretations of the parent 
return variable related to such factors.  For example, any common variation in affiliate 
returns or U.S. parent returns driven by changes in the host country currency to U.S. 
                                                 
9 Computational constraints limit the use of these fixed effects in the full sample.   15
dollar exchange rate is absorbed by the country/year fixed effects and cannot explain the 
results.  Since the specification also includes industry/year fixed effects, identification 
comes from variation within industries so shocks to specific sectors are also implicitly 
controlled for.  In the specification in column 7, the coefficients on parent domestic and 
foreign returns are similar to their level in previous specifications and retain their 
statistical significance.  Across all of the specifications, the domestic and foreign within-
MNC returns help explain an affiliate’s returns after controlling for various measures of 
local returns.   
Table 7 employs a similar empirical framework to investigate the interrelationship 
of investment within the multinational firm.  In columns 1 through 7 the dependent 
variable is the log of affiliate capital expenditures, and all specifications employ affiliate 
and year fixed effects.  As with returns, the coefficient on parent domestic investment in 
column 1 is positive and highly significant.  When the additional independent variable of 
other affiliate investment is included in column 2, the coefficient on parent domestic 
investment is reduced in magnitude but retains its statistical significance.  Other affiliate 
investment is also highly significant and the relevance of parent domestic and foreign 
activities for affiliate investment mirrors the results in Table 5.  In column 3, the 
additional control for local investment is highly significant but does not materially 
change the coefficients or significance levels of the within-parent variables.  When 
attention is restricted to the G-6 in columns 4 through 7, the results are qualitatively 
similar with parent domestic and foreign activities helping to explain affiliate investments 
after controlling for local investment rates.  As in Table 6, column 7 of this table includes 
country/year and industry/year fixed effects to pick up country or industry specific factors 
that might drive affiliate investment.  Parent domestic investment and investment by 
parent affiliates in other host countries remain positive and significant in explaining 
affiliate investment. 
The evidence provided on the correlates of affiliate investment might be affected 
by changes in firm scope related to merger activity or spin off activity.  In order to 
address this concern, we repeat the analysis in Table 7 using scaled measures of 
investment activity.  The results of this analysis appear in columns 8 through 14 of Table 
7.  The results are qualitatively similar to those in columns 1 through 7.  Both parent   16
domestic investment and investment by other affiliates of a parent are significantly 
correlated with affiliate investment.  The magnitude of the coefficients on these variables 
is similar for the full sample and for G-6 countries, and these results are robust to 
controlling for country and industry factors. 
6. Robustness  Checks 
The results in Tables 6 and 7 may reflect the dynamics of a particular industry 
(particularly petroleum) or the fact that some affiliates selling large fractions of their 
output to outside of their host country.  The analysis in Table 8 considers these two 
possible explanations using specifications similar to those already examined.  Although 
the results in Tables 6 and 7 are similar for specifications that do and do not include 
industry/year fixed effects, it could be the case that the results are driven by patterns in 
particularly important sectors such as petroleum.  For example, oil price shocks might 
have effects that differ across firms but are similar within firms in the petroleum sector.  
To address this possibility, we allow estimates of the correlations of affiliate returns and 
investment with returns and investment of other parts of the same firm to vary for 
affiliates within and outside of manufacturing since all petroleum related industries are 
classified outside of manufacturing in the BEA data.  We do this by classifying affiliates 
into manufacturing and non-manufacturing affiliates and including interactions of a 
dummy equal to one for affiliates outside of manufacturing and measures of parent and 
other affiliate returns in the basic specifications provided in Table 6.
10   
The specification presented in columns 1 of Table 8 is similar to the specifications 
of Table 6 but includes the additional interaction terms with the non-manufacturing 
dummy.  The 0.063 coefficient on parent ROE indicates that the returns of affiliates in 
manufacturing are significantly correlated with parent returns, and the 0.007 coefficient 
on parent ROE interacted with the non-manufacturing dummy indicates that this 
correlation is statistically indistinguishable for non-manufacturing affiliates.  The same 
pattern holds for the coefficient on other affiliate ROE.  Similar results are also obtained 
                                                 
10 The specifications in Table 8 also include controls for local market ROE and investment and their 
interactions with either the non-manufacturing dummy or local sales dummy.  These coefficients are not 
reported in order to emphasize the relative effect of industry and sales destination on the primary 
coefficients of interest.     17
in the specification presented in column 3 which includes country/year and industry/year 
fixed effects and is restricted to the G-6 sample.  The specifications in columns 5 and 7 of 
Table 8 are similar to those from columns 8 through 12 of Table 7 and illustrate that the 
correlations of investment within the multinational firm are also not distinctive for 
manufacturing affiliates.  It does not appear that peculiarities of a single dominant sector 
can explain the interrelationships of returns and investment within multinational firms. 
Another potential explanation of the results in Table 6 and Table 7 is that they 
represent the effect of trade linkages within multinational firms.  While it is not possible 
to isolate the extent to which affiliates buy inputs from abroad, it is possible to consider if 
within-firm correlations of returns and investment depend on the degree to which 
affiliates sell output locally or outside of their host country.  To do this, we create a 
dummy that is equal to one for affiliates that sell all of their output in their host country in 
all years they appear in the sample, and we interact this dummy with parent returns and 
other affiliate returns and include these interactions in specifications similar to those 
presented in Table 6. 
The results of these specifications appear in columns 2 and 4 of Table 8.  In 
column 2, the coefficient on parent ROE indicates that parent returns and affiliate returns 
of affiliates that sell some output abroad are positively correlated, and the small and 
insignificant coefficient on parent ROE interacted with the local sales focus dummy 
illustrates that this correlation is no different for affiliates that are purely focused on 
serving the domestic market.  The returns of locally focused affiliates and affiliates that 
sell goods abroad also exhibit similar correlations with the returns of other affiliates.  
These results are similar in the specification in column 4, which includes country/year 
and industry/year fixed effects and is restricted to G-6 countries.  The correlations of 
affiliate capital expenditures and parent capital expenditures and the correlations of 
affiliate capital expenditures and other affiliate capital expenditures are also no different 
for affiliates that are focused on the local market and those that sell outside of their host 
country, as the regressions presented in columns 6 and 8 of Table 8 demonstrate.    This 
evidence suggests that observed interrelationships of returns and investment within 
multinationals are not driven by the outward orientation of affiliate sales.   18
7. Conclusion 
U.S. multinationals comprise significant fractions of output and investment in 
much of the world.  Their rates of return and investment levels are more highly correlated 
around the world than many similar measures for local firms.  Controlling for local 
returns and investment levels, a multinational parent’s domestic and foreign operations 
are highly correlated with an affiliates returns and investment levels.  Although the 
results do not discriminate among all the channels through which multinationals could 
affect the transmission of economic shocks, they do indicate that interrelationship within 
multinational firms are not solely driven by affiliates outside of manufacturing or by 
affiliates that play a role in a worldwide production process and sell goods outside of 
their host country. 
These results generate a number of additional questions.  Given the high degree of 
interdependence in returns across countries for multinational firms, is it fair to view them 
as an asset class that provides exposure to foreign markets?  If, indeed, investment plans 
and returns are highly correlated around the world within a multinational firm, this may 
help explain why investors place a limited value on mutlinationality, as examined in 
Errunza and Senbet (1984) and Morck and Yeung (1991).  What characteristics of 
multinational firms – their internal capital markets, their intrafirm trade, their ability to 
explore intangible property in several locations – are driving these linkages in returns and 
investments?  If these linkages are so significant, how should firms consider capital 
budgeting when they allocate capital around the world? 
Similarly, these facts prompt questions related to the nature of economic linkages.  
To what degree is the emergence of an Anglo business cycle and the distinct dynamic of 
Japan, as in Stock and Watson (2003), a reflection of the nature of FDI flows between 
those countries?  What exogenous shocks might usefully be employed to better identify 
the relevance of multinational firms for transmitting shocks?  How can macroeconomic 
models used to decompose the sources of global correlations incorporate the activities of 
multinational firms?  If financial integration through foreign direct investment is 
associated with such highly correlated investments and returns, what are the welfare 
consequences of such integration?  We leave these questions for future research.   19
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China 2.81% 0.00% 2.64% 0.00% 2.83% 0.17% 4.68% 0.70%
Hong Kong 0.44% 0.43% 0.52% 0.91% 0.68% 1.21% 0.75% 1.41%
India 2.71% 0.10% 2.25% 0.05% 1.68% 0.06% 2.10% 0.19%
Japan 15.30% 2.05% 22.90% 4.65% 25.10% 5.39% 21.23% 5.34%
Korea 1.04% 0.10% 1.70% 0.23% 2.10% 0.36% 1.92% 0.58%
Singapore 0.21% 0.50% 0.23% 0.73% 0.36% 1.42% 0.39% 1.74%
Taiwan 0.68% 0.28% 1.15% 0.60% 1.27% 0.70% 1.36% 1.07%
Europe
Belgium 1.23% 2.29% 1.22% 2.66% 1.23% 2.92% 1.19% 2.33%
France 7.84% 5.44% 7.58% 7.02% 7.05% 7.87% 6.82% 6.62%
Germany 10.50% 11.07% 10.49% 11.12% 10.91% 13.68% 9.94% 10.93%
Ireland 0.29% 0.85% 0.29% 1.39% 0.29% 1.57% 0.45% 2.62%
Italy 5.59% 3.79% 6.73% 5.14% 5.35% 4.62% 5.58% 3.96%
Netherlands 2.01% 2.41% 1.83% 4.12% 1.82% 3.61% 1.88% 3.36%
Norway 0.85% 1.98% 0.76% 1.30% 0.64% 1.12% 0.73% 1.11%
Spain 2.59% 1.15% 3.04% 2.30% 2.63% 2.00% 2.85% 1.90%
Sweden 1.44% 0.84% 1.53% 0.69% 1.08% 0.63% 1.15% 1.09%
Switzerland 1.39% 1.43% 1.38% 1.59% 1.36% 1.75% 1.22% 1.58%
United Kingdom 6.73% 17.19% 6.49% 16.42% 5.44% 15.55% 6.89% 18.19%
North America
Canada 4.22% 15.21% 4.22% 16.24% 2.90% 11.87% 3.07% 11.61%
Mexico 2.42% 1.59% 1.72% 1.52% 2.19% 2.44% 2.27% 3.10%
Oceania
Australia 2.54% 4.50% 2.35% 4.33% 1.80% 3.72% 1.92% 3.46%
South America
Argentina 1.17% 1.30% 0.59% 0.49% 1.34% 1.05% 1.34% 1.28%
Brazil 3.92% 5.01% 3.46% 5.49% 2.85% 4.17% 2.51% 2.93%
Total 77.92% 79.50% 85.09% 89.00% 82.90% 87.87% 82.22% 87.12%
Note: The table provides information on the distribtuion of GDP and U.S. multinational gross product across countries in 1982, 1989, 1994 and 
1999.  GDP Share is the ratio of individual country GDP to total non-U.S. GDP.  MNC Share is the ratio total U.S. multinational gross product in a 
country to the gross product of U.S. multinational affiliates worldwide.  The table is restricted to those countries that, in 1999, comprise either one 
percent of non-U.S. world output or one percent of U.S. multinational gross product. 
Year
Table 1: The Distribution of Global Output and US Multinational Activity Around the World, 1982, 1989, 1994, 
and 1999
1982 1989 1994 1999Average Ratio of U.S. 
MNC Gross Product 
to GDP, 1982-1999
Ratio of U.S. MNC 
Gross Product to 
GDP, 1999
Average Ratio of U.S. 
MNC Capital 
Expenditures to Gross 
Fixed Capital 
Formation, 1982-1999
Ratio of U.S. MNC 
Capital Expenditures to 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation, 1999
Asia
China 0.10% 0.40% 0.24% 0.45%
Hong Kong 3.93% 5.06% 3.35% 3.28%
India 0.10% 0.24% 0.14% 0.37%
Japan 0.49% 0.67% 0.21% 0.32%
Korea 0.38% 0.81% 0.26% 0.41%
Singapore 8.43% 11.92% 5.08% 7.57%
Taiwan 1.23% 2.11% NA NA
Europe
Belgium 5.26% 5.27% 3.21% 2.74%
France 2.31% 2.60% 1.47% 1.56%
Germany 2.82% 2.94% 1.59% 1.79%
Ireland 12.00% 15.65% 7.64% 9.69%
Italy 1.86% 1.90% 0.85% 0.99%
Netherlands 4.49% 4.78% 3.38% 3.25%
Norway 4.85% 4.10% 5.27% 4.40%
Spain 1.64% 1.79% 1.23% 1.23%
Sweden 1.52% 2.55% 1.12% 2.17%
Switzerland 2.86% 3.46% 1.15% 2.10%
United Kingdom 6.72% 7.07% 6.80% 8.47%
North America
Canada 9.47% 10.12% 8.45% 11.16%
Mexico 2.42% 3.65% 2.56% 4.15%
Oceania
Australia 4.53% 4.83% 3.46% 5.35%
South America
Argentina 2.22% 2.56% 2.47% 3.92%
Brazil 3.51% 3.12% 2.49% 3.51%
Table 2: The Scope of U.S. Multinational Activity, 1982-1999 and 1999
Note: The table provides the ratio of U.S. multinational gross product (capital expenditure) to country GDP (gross fixed capital 
formation), by country, averaged from 1982 to 1999 and 1999.  The table is restricted to those countries that, in 1999, comprise either 
one percent of non-U.S. world output or one percent of U.S. multinational gross product. Mean Median Standard Deviation
Correlation Tables
Multinational Measures
ROR 0.1894 0.1864 0.0929
ROE 0.1308 0.1275 0.0440
ROA 0.0399 0.0392 0.0158
Capital Expenditures 5,266,974 4,057,498 4,464,127
Capital Expenditures/Gross Product 0.1383 0.1311 0.0391
Capital Expenditures/Assets 0.0466 0.0449 0.0178
Local Firm Measures
ROR  
ROE 0.1118 0.1151 0.0337
Stock Returns 0.1623 0.1514 0.3129
Capital Expenditures 322,000,000,000 203,000,000,000 328,000,000,000
Capital Expenditures/Gross Product 0.2156 0.2089 0.0380
Regression Tables
Affiliate ROE 0.1586 0.1285 0.3797
Parent ROE 0.1202 0.1273 0.2290
Other Affiliate ROE 0.1381 0.1284 0.1958
Host Country ROE 0.1201 0.1197 0.0340
Log of Affiliate Capital Expenditures 6.3604 6.5221 2.4253
Log of Parent Capital Expenditures 11.7526 11.9585 2.1054
Log of Other Affiliate Capital Expenditures 10.6546 10.8314 2.5011
24.9104 25.1231 1.5006
Affiliate Capital Expenditures/Assets 0.0504 0.0161 0.1108
Parent Capital Expenditures/Assets 0.0518 0.0439 0.0480
Other Affiliate Capital Expenditures/Assets 0.0457 0.0345 0.0542
0.2187 0.2095 0.0487
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Note: The two panels of the table provide descriptive statistics for the correlation tables and regression tables, respectively.  Each of the 
Multinational Measures in the correlation tables relates to measures for the G-8 (excluding Russia and the U.S.) and are based on the 
activities of U.S. multinationals from 1982 to 1999 as described in the text.  Local Firm Measures relate to measures for the G-8 
(excluding Russia and the U.S.) and are drawn from Poterba (1999), Ken French's website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/) and the World Bank Development Indicators as described in the text.  
"Affiliate," "Parent" and "Other Affiliate"  variables are associated with a multinational affiliate, their parent's domestic activity, and 
their parent's other foreign operations, respectively.  "Host country" refers to the country of activity for the multinational activity and 
that data is drawn from the Ken French website (for  ROEs) and World Bank Development Indicators (for gross fixed capital formation).
Log of Host Country Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation
Host Country Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation/GDPROR ROE ROA ROR ROE ROA ROR ROE ROA ROR ROE ROA ROR ROE ROA
France   0.90 0.54 0.51
(0.11) (0.21) (0.22)
Germany   0.90 0.29 0.41 0.94 0.78 0.87
(0.11) (0.24) (0.23) (0.09) (0.16) (0.12)
Italy   0.87 0.22 0.20 0.96 0.71 0.68 0.93 0.43 0.59
(0.13) (0.24) (0.25) (0.07) (0.18) (0.18) (0.09) (0.23) (0.20)
0.96 0.43 0.55 0.94 0.74 0.64 0.96 0.48 0.70 0.94 0.65 0.64
(0.07) (0.23) (0.21) (0.08) (0.17) (0.19) (0.07) (0.22) (0.18) (0.08) (0.19) (0.19)
Japan 0.92 0.66 0.68 0.97 0.83 0.70 0.94 0.51 0.69 0.95 0.64 0.70 0.97 0.66 0.82
















France   0.31 NA NA
(0.26)
Germany   0.47 NA NA 0.90 0.71 0.81
(0.25) (0.12) (0.18) (0.15)
Italy   0.50 NA NA 0.96 0.65 0.88 0.93 0.54 0.84
(0.24) (0.08) (0.19) (0.12) (0.11) (0.21) (0.13)
0.43 NA NA 0.49 -0.02 0.58 0.57 -0.07 0.67 0.61 0.25 0.64
(0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.20) (0.23) (0.25) (0.18) (0.22) (0.24) (0.19)
Japan 0.20 NA NA 0.67 0.67 0.60 0.56 0.63 0.31 0.55 0.38 0.50 -0.19 -0.47 0.35
(0.27) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.23) (0.19) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.27) (0.22) (0.23)
Table 4: The Correlation of Returns for U.S. Multinationals and Local Firms, 1982-1999
Note: This table provides correlations of different measures of returns over the 1982-1999 period across G-8 countries excluding the U.S. and Russia.  The top panel contains information for the affiliates of 
U.S. multinational firms.  ROR is the affiliate rate of return which is calculated as the ratio of returns to capital to total assets.  Returns to capital include profit-type return, net interest paid, indirect business 
taxes, and capital consumption allowances.  ROE is the return on equity, measured as the ratio of net income to owners' equity.  ROA is the return on assets, measured as the ration of net income to total 
assets.  The bottom panel contains information for local firms.  Measures of rates of return for local firms are taken from Poterba (1999) and cover only the 1982-1996 period.  Measures of ROE and $ Stock 
Returns for local firms are taken from the Ken French website.  Standard error appear below each correlation coefficient in parentheses.
U.S. Multinational Firms
Local Firms
Canada   France   Germany   Italy  






Germany   United Kingdom Italy  France   0.77 -0.40 0.66
(0.16) (0.23) (0.19)
Germany   0.87 0.29 0.68 0.92 0.22 0.95
(0.12) (0.24) (0.18) (0.10) (0.24) (0.08)
Italy   0.85 0.47 0.76 0.94 0.29 0.89 0.95 0.39 0.89
(0.13) (0.22) (0.16) (0.09) (0.24) (0.11) (0.08) (0.23) (0.11)
0.89 0.06 0.85 0.83 0.60 0.90 0.92 0.57 0.90 0.90 0.50 0.94
(0.12) (0.25) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.11) (0.10) (0.21) (0.11) (0.11) (0.22) (0.08)
0.93 0.34 0.80 0.89 0.37 0.92 0.94 0.55 0.93 0.91 0.38 0.91 0.88 0.25 0.93
(0.09) (0.24) (0.15) (0.11) (0.23) (0.10) (0.08) (0.21) (0.09) (0.10) (0.23) (0.10) (0.12) (0.24) (0.09)
France   0.88
(0.12)
Germany   0.76 0.96
(0.16) (0.07)
Italy   0.91 0.96 0.87
(0.11) (0.07) (0.12)
0.79 0.95 0.98 0.86
(0.15) (0.08) (0.06) (0.13)
0.96 0.90 0.82 0.90 0.81
(0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15)
Table 5: The Correlation of Investment Rates for U.S. Multinationals and Local Firms, 1982-1999
Note:This table provides correlations of different measures of investment activity over the 1982-1999 period across G-8 countries excluding the U.S. and Russia.  The top panel contains information for 
the affiliates of U.S. multinational firms.  Capital Expenditures is the log of  affiliate capital expenditures and capital expenditures/gross product is the ratio of affiliate capital expenditures to affiliate gross 
product.  Capital expenditures/assets is the ratio of affiliate capital expenditures to affiliate assets.  The bottom panel contains information for local firms.  Gross fixed capital formation data from the 
World Banks are used to measure country investment and the log of these expenditures and these expenditures scaled by country GDP are used as measures of capital expenditures and capital 
expenditures/gross product.  Standard error appear below each correlation coefficient in parentheses.
U.S. Multinational Firms
Local Firms
Canada   France   Germany   Italy   United Kingdom










































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 0.1638 0.1458 0.1584 0.1062 0.1514 0.1320 0.1975
(0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0134) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0166) (0.0653)
Parent ROE 0.0878 0.0679 0.0671 0.0887 0.0662 0.0668 0.0620
(0.0111) (0.0102) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0165) (0.0133)
Other Affiliate ROE 0.1400 0.1619 0.1318 0.1598 0.1256
(0.0144) (0.0192) (0.0161) (0.0214) (0.0158)
0.0465 0.1563
(0.0817) (0.1314)
Affiliate and Year Fixed 
Effects? YYY YYYN
Affiliate, Country/Year, and 
Industry/Year Fixed Effects? NNN NNNY
No. of Obs. 178,980 170,634 99,696 76,372 70,892 54,141 70,892
R-Squared 0.5156 0.5184 0.5064 0.4981 0.5014 0.5027 0.5063
Note: The dependent variable in these specifications is affiliate ROE defined as the ratio of net income to owner's equity.  The 
specifications in columns in 4 through 7 are restricted to affiliates in G-6 countries.  The specifications in columns 1 through 6 and 8 
employ affiliate and year fixed effects.  The specification in column 7 employs affiliate, country/year and industry/year fixed effects.  
"Parent ROE" is the ratio of net income to owner's equity of the affiliate's parent in the U.S.  "Other Affiliate ROE" is the ratio of net 
income to owner's equity of the other foreign affiliates of the affiliate's parent.  "Host Country ROE" is the return on equity for local firms 
taken from the Ken French website.    Standard errors are clustered at the affiliate level. 
Table 6




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Constant 3.7416 2.6550 -12.5957 3.6315 2.9509 -17.1811 2.4224 0.0505 0.0380 0.0264 0.0289 0.0196 0.0177 0.1631
(0.2156) (0.2524) (1.1998) (0.2128) (0.2597) (2.4016) (0.4886) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0051) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0075) (0.0213)
0.2043 0.1445 0.1385 0.2102 0.1574 0.1564 0.1455
(0.0190) (0.0161) (0.0154) (0.0194) (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0186)
0.2106 0.2071 0.1902 0.1898 0.1848
(0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0166)
0.6104 0.7582
(0.0465) (0.0906)
0.1455 0.0961 0.0991 0.1177 0.0842 0.0842 0.0809
(0.0273) (0.0208) (0.0217) (0.0261) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0211)
0.2928 0.3043 0.2771 0.2771 0.2703





No. of Obs. 161,034 153,022 146,262 71,325 65,691 65,691 65,687 210,132 201,042 186,693 89,201 83,227 83,227 83,227
R-Squared 0.7867 0.7906 0.7894 0.7950 0.8008 0.8018 0.8075 0.5867 0.5946 0.5940 0.5673 0.5780 0.5780 0.5829
Formation/GDP" is the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP in the country of the affilaite.  Standard errors are clustered at the affiliate level. 
Affiliate Capital Expenditure/Assets
All countries G-6 All countries G-6
Table 7
The Interrelationship of Capital Expenditures Within Multinational Firms
Log Affiliate Capital Exenditure 
Affiliate and Year Fixed 
Effects?
Affiliate, Country/Year, 
and Industry/Year Fixed 
Effects?
Note: The dependent variable in the specifications presented in columns 1 through 7 is the log of affiliate capital expenditures.  The dependent variable in the specifications presented in columns 8 through 14 is 
the ratio of affiliate capital expenditures to affiliate assets.  The specifications in columns in 4 through 7 and 11 through 14 are restricted to affiliates in G-6 countries.  The specifications in columns 1 through 6 
and 8 through 13 employ affiliate and year fixed effects.  The specifications in columns 7 and 14 employ affiliate, country/year and industry/year fixed effects.  "Log of Parent Capital Expenditures" is the log of 
capital expenditures of the affiliates parent in the U.S.  "Log of Other Affiliate Capital Expenditure" is the log of capital expenditures of other foreign affiliates of the affiliate's parent.  "Log of Host Country 
Fixed Capital Formation" is the log of gross fixed capital formation in the country of the affiliate.  "Parent Capital Expenditure/Assets" is the ratio of the capital expenditure of an affiliate's parent in the U.S. to 
their U.S. assets.  "Other Affiliate Capital Expenditure/Assets" is the ratio of the capital expenditure of an affiliate's parent abroad to their foreign assets.  "Host Country Gross Fixed Capital
Log of Parent Capital 
Exenditure




Other Affiliate Capital 
Expenditure/Assets
Host Country Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation/GDP
Log of Host Country Gross 
Fixed Capital FormationDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.1589 0.1597 0.1238 0.1171 Constant 0.0254 0.0280 0.1781 -0.3292
(0.0136) (0.0130) (0.0771) (0.0717) (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0169) (0.0105)
Parent ROE 0.0626 0.0712 0.0473 0.0604 0.1370 0.1006 0.1292 0.0935
(0.0189) (0.0158) (0.0190) (0.0167) (0.0230) (0.0193) (0.0250) (0.0161)
0.0072 0.0330 -0.0584 -0.0748
(0.0230) (0.0262) (0.0385) (0.0402)
Parent ROE * Local Sales Focus  -0.0232 -0.0001 0.0088 -0.0228
(0.0254) (0.0271) (0.0529) (0.0636)
Other Affiliate ROE 0.1650 0.1760 0.1142 0.1340 0.2577 0.2507 0.2078 0.2406
(0.0249) (0.0205) (0.0211) (0.0188) (0.0307) (0.0374) (0.0384) (0.0435)
-0.0034 0.0148 0.0705 0.1021
(0.0339) (0.0299) (0.0651) (0.0795)
-0.0591 -0.0381 0.2091 0.1340
(0.0362) (0.0304) (0.1125) (0.1341)
Affiliate and Year Fixed Effects? YYNN YYNN
Affiliate, Country/Year, and 
Industry/Year Fixed Effects? NNYY NNYY
No. of Obs. 96,169 91,977 68,441 65,655 180,167 171,904 80,244 77,215
R-Squared 0.5056 0.4975 0.5044 0.4985 0.5964 0.5722 0.5844 0.5642
G-6
Parent CapEx/Assets * Non 
Manufacturing Dummy
Parent CapEx/Assets * Local 
Sales Focus Dummy
Parent CapEx/Assets
All Countries G-6 All Countries
Other Affiliate CapEx/Assets
Other Affiliate CapEx/Assets 
* Non Manufacturing Dummy
Other Affiliate CapEx/Assets 
* Local Sales Focus Dummy
Table 8
Industry Factors, Trade Linkages, and the Interrelationship of Returns and Capital Expenditures
Affiliate ROE Affiliate Capital Expenditure/Assets
Note: The dependent variable in the specifications presented in columns 1 through 4 is affiliate ROE.  The dependent variable in the specifications presented in columns 5 through 8 is the ratio of 
affiliate capital expenditures to affiliate assets.  The specifications in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 employ affiliate and year fixed effects.  The specifications in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 are restricted to G-6 
countries and employ affiliate, country/year and industry/year fixed effects. "Non Manufacturing Dummy" is equal to one if an affiliate's main industry is not a manufacturing industry.  "Local Sales 
Focus Dummy" is equal to one if all of the affiliate's sale are directed at the affiliate's host country market.  "Parent ROE" is the ratio of net income to owner's equity of the affiliate's parent in the 
U.S.  "Other Affiliate ROE" is the ratio of net income to owner's equity of the other foreign affiliates of the affiliate's parent.  "Parent CapEx/Assets" is the ratio of the capital expenditure of an 
affiliate's parent in the U.S. to their U.S. assets.  "Other Affiliate CapEx/Assets" is the ratio of the capital expenditure of an affiliate's parent abroad to their foreign assets.  All specifications include, 
but do not report, measures of host country activity (as in Tables 6 and 7) and those measures interacted with the dummy variables.   Standard errors are clustered at the affiliate level.
Parent ROE * Non 
Manufacturing Dummy
Other Affiliate ROE * Non 
Manufacturing Dummy
Other Affiliate ROE * Local 
Sales Focus Dummy